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cording to [9], a cyber- electronic attack is an offen- cyber-electronic attack.
sive where Electronic Warfare (EW) actions seek not
only to manipulate the tactical information obtained MECHANISM FOR CYBER-ELECTRONIC
through the electromagnetic spectrum (as in the tradi- ATTACK
tional EW), but also to manipulate the computational
process of the target system. In the cyber-electronic attack addressed in this
In [11], the authors present an EA technique able work, it is assumed that the electromagnetic spectrum
to forge multiple false targets, with different ranges, is used by the attacker to send a sequence of forged
within the radar detection range. The purpose of their pulses to the radar receiver, as in [11], which is coded
technique is to produce multiple fabricated targets and, in time/range to represent a command to the cyber
thus, make the radar operator unable to distinguish mechanism hosted in the radar. Once the command is
between the real target and the false targets. Note that acknowledged, the cyber component of the attack can
in their case, the target detection information is manip- start to manipulate the radar computational process
ulated, but the radar computational process continues to perform malicious actions, such as reset the system,
to run normally. To make such EA able to manipulate stop to update the Plan Position Indicator (PPI), or even
the computational process, it would be necessary to record and replay scenarios. The focus of this work is
have in the radar system a mechanism prepared to ac- not on the generation of the forged radar echoes (an
knowledge the false information produced by the EA action in the EW domain represented in Figure 1), nei-
as a command to trigger the malicious cyber mecha- ther in the details about the manipulation of the radar
nism responsible for manipulating the system behavior. computational process (an action in the CW domain
Note that for such a cyber-electronic attack, it is represented in Figure 1). The focus of this work is on
necessary to have a cyber component previously im- the linking mechanism that lies between both domains
planted in the radar computing system. On this aspect, to make a cyber-electronic attack feasible in a naval
the literature report vulnerabilities implanted in air radar system. The mechanism herein proposed for this
gapped systems (which is often the case of naval radar task is based on a template matching technique [14].
systems). These vulnerabilities can be implemented ei-
ther in software, as in the Stuxnet [12], or in hardware
through supply chain attacks, as in [6,13]. Special at-
tention should be given to the operation Orchard.
According to [6], commercial off-the-shelf micropro-
cessors contained in the Syrian radar might have been
purposely fabricated with a hidden hardware back-
door (referred to as kill switch) which, by receiving a
preprogrammed code had its functions disrupted and
temporarily blocked the radar.
In this context, the aim of this work is to show Fig. 1. Linking mechanism between EW and CW do-
– for awareness purpose – how the electronic and cy- mains
ber warfare can be linked. As previously discussed, in
[11] the authors present an EA able to produce mul-
tiple forged echoes for radar systems. In [6], the author
presents clues about the implantation of a cyber vul-
nerability to affect radar systems, but does not explain
how such vulnerability can be triggered as the conve-
nience of the attacker, especially if radar computers are
air gapped and the only path to send commands to a
previously installed vulnerability is through the radar
antenna. In this work we demonstrate a mechanism Fig. 2. Example of a template matching
that can be used to link the electronic and cyber war-
fare domains – a key element for the construction of a The template matching technique is used in image

70 REVISTA ACADÊMICA CIENTÍFICA DO CIAW