Page 79 - Economia Azul - versão: inglês

In this way, subsidies, as well as fees, fees – as strategies for behavior change acceptable amount of pollution in the en- the access of people to oceanic fisheries
can also be used to drive behavior change, and eventual reduction of damage to the vironment and distributes or places these resources) (FIELD; FIELD, 2014; STERNER;
but unlike charges, which serve to curb a marine environment must, however, con- pollution rights for sale on the market. CORIA, 2012; TIETENBERG; LEWIS, 2015).
type of behavior, subsidies can be imple- sider effects that can result in inefficiency Each holder of these licenses or certificates Examples of economic instruments for this
mented to encourage behavior and the and ineffectiveness of results. In this way, will therefore have the right to emit an type of market failure are quotas for the
adoption of environmentally sustainable policies must be designed to generate in- amount of pollution corresponding to the use of natural resources, tradable license
productive methods.. They can be adopt- centives that do not further burden the total of licenses held. The difference, if he/ programs and cap-and-trade. Through
ed, for example, to encourage the devel- marine environment and, therefore, do she pollutes more than what it is permissi- these instruments, the right to use natural
opment of renewable ocean energy, the not become so-called “perverse subsi- ble, considering the total number of licens- resources is distributed among those who
reuse of plastic packaging with deposit-re- dies”. An example of this type of subsidy es held, he/she must abate (depollute). In do so up to a certain limit and can be trad-
fund systems, the implementation of pol- were those destined for the fishing sector short, this market for emission allowances ed in markets. In the Blue Economy, these
lution control systems on vessels and the by reducing fuel prices or encouraging works in a cap-and-trade format; a stan- have been applied to the use of fishing re-
elimination/reduction of tariffs for “envi- the acquisition of new vessels; they were dard (cap) is set, divided into allowances, sources, since their use without regulation
ronmental goods” (FLYNN, 2015; KUWA- considered harmful, as they promote ex- which confer a “right” to pollute, and can lead to the depletion of target species
HATA; MONROY, 2011; OOSTERHUIS et cess fleet capacity and overexploitation there is the possibility of the purchase and and, eventually, the fishing industry itself
al., 2014; UNCTAD, 2014). of fishing stocks, via fishing activity cost sale of these licenses (trade). From this, becomes unfeasible.
Subsidies can take the form of direct reduction, which allow fishing to contin- companies will decide how to act in the Programs such as these establish, for
transfers of funds (loans, for example), tax ue at inefficient economic levels (BANCO market, according to the confrontation example, “total allowable catch”, “indi-
exemptions, research and development MUNDIAL – WORLD BANK, 2016). between the marginal cost of abatement vidual quotas”, “individual transferable
(R&D) support, etc. The main objective is and the price of licenses (PEARCE; TURN- quotas”, “individual quotas per vessel”
to achieve the reduction of emissions by 2.3. Tradable license systems ER, 1989; FAUCHEUX; NOËL, 1995; PER- or even “community quotas”, in order to
agents, but it can also encourage the de- MAN et al., 1996). make clear the allocation of rights to to-
velopment and diffusion of new cleaner Although not highlighted by OECD It is important to highlight that the ap- tal capture of a fishery for an individual or
technologies, helping to create new mar- (2017), tradable license systems are also an proach of this economic instrument differs group (groups can be community-based);
kets for environmental resources and ser- important economic instrument in the con- from that used by fees and subsidies, in- these can usually be shared or traded in
vices, in addition to encouraging new con- text of the Blue Economy. Fees and subsi- sofar as the emission license markets work markets. In a catch-sharing program,
sumer behaviors (SANTOS, 2014). dies are instruments commonly applied to with quantities, instead of considering pric- catch limits are established throughout
It is clear, however, that subsidies be- correct externalities (positive or negative) es. The same approach is also adopted by the fishery, and then portions of the catch,
come inefficient if their existence leads to of the production process, aiming to inter- command-and-control instruments, which or parts, are assigned to participants and
an overproduction of the subsidized prod- nalize social costs and benefits generated limit pollution emissions through standards; must remain within the limit (HOLLAND et
uct or if they create undue profits for in- by productive activities. However, other however, what differentiates the emission al., 2015; JARDINE; SANCHIRICO, 2012).
dividuals or parts of the market. In other types of market failures, for example, the permit markets from this instrument is the In Brazil, quotas have been estab-
words, these must be temporary, because use of common resources as inputs in pro- possibility of transferring the permits by the lished for fishing for mullet (Mugil liza)
at the same time they are constructive, duction, nevertheless require economic in- market (PERMAN et al., 1996). in the south and southeast of the coun-
when used to obtain new technologies struments that focus on the lack of proper- From an economic point of view, fish- try. Since 2018, the catch limit has been
for the market, making it more compet- ty rights over these goods. ery resources from the ocean are exam- established by season and by modality
itive, and destructive, when used for a According to Faucheux and Noël ples of “common resources”, being called along with individual quotas per vessel
long time, creating interests that are dif- (1995), the operation of tradable permit “rivals” (intensive use can deplete fishery (BRASIL, 2018). This establishment was
ficult to resolve in the future (EEA, 2005). systems is as follows: the State, or the con- resources) and “non-excludable” (in prin- adopted based on the need for fisheries
The adoption of subsidies – as well as trol agency, decides in advance about the ciple, it is difficult to control or prevent management of this important resource

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